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DOES THE "BONE-DRY" LAW PROHIBIT THE INTER,
STATE TRANSPORTATION OF INTOXICANTS
BY THE OWNER FOR PERSONAL USE?
By THomAS PoRTER

HARDMAN*

T has been recently held by the Federal courts, sitting in West.
Virginia Districts,' that interstate transportation of intoxicants.
by the owner for personal use is not interstate commerce, and,
2
therefore, not prohibited by the so-called "Bone-Dry" Law. But3
contra,
squarely
decisions
prior
two
least
at
are
inasmuch as there
and apparently none in accord, it would seem proper, in view of the
far-reaching effect of these recent decisions, to examine the soundness of their conclusions.What, then, is commerce, or rather what is commerce in the
sense in which that term is used in the Constitution? The specific
aspect of this question as it arose in the principal case was whether
the owner of intoxicants who personally carries the same from one
state to another, not for purposes of trade but for personal use,
is transporting intoxicants in interstate commerce. The court
held that such a transaction is interstate transportationas distinguished from interstate commere, the reason assigned being that
the term commerce "necessarily connotes" a business transaction.
The only authority cited is Webster's Dictionary; but even if it is
admitted that the ordinary dictionary definition of the term does
not cover such a transaction (which, however, is not admitted), still
it does not follow that such a transaction is not commerce in the
sense in which that term is used in the Constitution. Doubtless,
a lexicographer might not think that a person simply walking acros
a bridge from one state to another is engaged in interstate commerce, nor does such a transaction come within that part of the die*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
'United States v. Mitchell, 245 Fed. 601 (S. D., W. Va. 1917). The other case,
from the Northern District of West Virginia, is unreported. Hence, the reported
case will be herein referred to as the principal case.
-ACT March 3, 1917, c. 162, § 5, 39 STAT. 1069. Whether this Act c-uld be construed Jo extend only to transportation by mail is a point not mentioned by the court,
and, hence, no opinion is herein expressed upon that point
'State v. Holleyman, 55 S. C. 207, 33 S. U. 366 (1899); Alexander r. State, 3.
Okla. Cr. 478. 106 Pae. 98 (51).
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tionary definition which is quoted by the court, but the Supreme
Court of the United States has definitely decided-that such an interstate passage is commerce in the constitutional sense, and that,
too, apparently, irrespective of the "commercial" or "non-commercial" purpose of the persons so passing. Does the term commerce, then, in the sense in which it is used in the Constitution,
"necessarily connote" a so-called "commercial" or business transaction? It was argued in the leading case on interstate commerce'
(the argument doubtless being based largely on the lay conception
of the term) that commerce was confined to traffic, but Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, irrefutably answered the
argument in an elaborate opinion which has ever since been regarded as the starting point on every question of interstate commerce. Said the learned Chief Justice:6
"The counsel for the appellee would limit it [commerce] to
traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities .

.

[But] this would restrict a general term, applicable

to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse
.... The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulat-

ing commerce . .. which shall . ..be confined to prescrib-

ing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter."

If, then, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the term
"commerce" as used in the Constitution, "is a termn of the largest
import," 7 and cannot be restricted "to one of its significations,"s
it becomes important to ascertain what the "largest import" of
the term is-what "its significations" are. According to the best
authorities, including Webster's Dictionary cited by the court in
the principal case, the word commerce has two principal "significations": (1) business intercourse, and (2) social or personal intercourse or communication. Moreover, this latter signification was
the more widely developed in the early use of the word commerce
and has ever since been quite common.' Furthermore, it may be
appropriately observed that the word commerce comes from the
'Covington, etc. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204 (1894).
'Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat i (U. S. 1824).
$At p. 189. Italics ours.
7Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 280 (1875).
8Gibbons v. Ogden, supra.
9

See CENTURy DICoNARY AND ENcYcLOPEDIA; and WEBsTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY.
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Latin word commercium which, like its English derivative, has a
double and very comprehensive meaning: (1) commercial or bulsiness intercourse, (2) non-commercial intercourse or conmnunication. 10 For example, the Romans spoke of a social exchange of
letters as commerce (commercium)," and, in fact the word commerce is still sometimes used to convey that meaning or similar
meanings.' 2 The derivative word "commercial," however, has been
confined to only "one of the significations" of the root word commerce, viz., to business transactions; and doubtless it is partly to
this conception that the holding in the principal case must be attributed. But the power given to Congress was to "regulate commerce," not to "regulate commercial transactions." Therefore, to
use again the language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,' 3 the holding
in the principal case, if correct, would "restrict a genera term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations," but such a
restriction the great expounder of the Constitution held could not
be made.
Such being the "large import" of the term, the next important
question is whether in giving Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce the broad purpose, comprehending the evil sought
to be remedied, is necessarily confined to purely business or socalled "commercial" transactions. "It is a matter of public history that the object of vesting in Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the states was to insure
uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating
state legislation." 4 Prior to the adoption of the Constitution the
states imposed different import and export duties, which, of course,
resulted in exceedingly vexatious state regulations and restrictions. Hence, the general purpose of the commerce clause was,
broadly speaking, to prevent interference by a state with the free
interstate transportation of persons or property. 5 Doesn't this
purpose, then, cover transactions like that in the principal case?
It is difficult to see why it does not, for if such interstate transportation is not interstate commerce then one wishing to transport
his own property for personal use from, say, New York to San
"OSee -LRPFER's LATIN DICTIONARY.
'1d. See also, SENECA, EPISTOLAz, 38, 1:

"Me0ito exigis uit h0o inter no8 episto-

larum commercium frequentemus."
USes e. g., EMnnSoN, FnmDNDSEirP and CENVURY DICTIONARY.
131n Gibbons v. Ogden, supra.
"'County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697 (1880).
USee 24 HARv. L. Rsv. 230.
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Franeisco might be subjected to all sorts of "conflicting and discriminating state legislation." For instance, suppose that A has
a pleasure ear which he never uses for "commercial" purposes and
he wishes to drive it from New York to San Francisco for purely
pleasure purposes. Could each state tax him for the mere privilege
of crossing the state line? Or could the interlying states put prohibitive taxes on the flask of brandy which he carries in his pocket
for the purpose of using in ease of accident? It would seem clear
that such transactions fall within the general purpose of the commerce clause and, hence, constitute interstate commerce. To hold
so would neither do violence to language, nor violate legal principle, but would not only effectuate justice, but be in harmony with
every definition 16 of commerce that has ever been propounded by
the highest court of the land. Thus, the most generally accepted
definition of commerce is the one laid down by the United States
Supreme Court in County of Mobile v. Kimball,"7 and repeated
verbatim in numerous subsequent cases:
"Commerce .... consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms, navigation, and the transportation and
transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale
and exchange of commodities."
Perhaps the most satisfactory judicial exposition of the term is
the one recently quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court in International Textbook Co. v. Pigg.5 Said the
court:
"Importation into one state from another is the indispensable element, the test, of interstate commerce; and every negotiation, contract, trade, and dealing......
which contemplates and causes such importationwhether it be of goods, persons or information, is a transaction of interstate commerce."
The omitted words are, "between citizens of different states,"
but it seems quite clear that diverse citizenship has nothing to do
'$The term definition is here used in its strict sense and does not include a mere
description of what is commerce in a particular case. Thus, the Supreme Court has
said that "transportation for others as an independent business is commerce irrespective of the purpose" of the transportation. Hanley v. Kansas City, etc. Co., 187
U. S. 617, 619 (1903). But the court did not say that transportation not for others
as an independent business is not commerce. This passage is further explained below.
MSupra.

Italics ours.

23217 U. S. 91 (1910).
Fed. 1. Italics ours.

Quotation from Butler Shoe Co. v. United States Co.. 156
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with commerce; and besides, the Supreme Court has held recently
that transportation by the owner for himself, i. e., transportation
not "between citizens of different states" may be commerce.x9 In
other words, as it was more concisely expressed by the United
States Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Husen,20 "transportation
is. essential to commerce or rather it is commerce itself," i. e., commerce in the constitutional sense is simply transportation (including transit and transmission) of persons or things. Moreover, this
conception of the term commerce, viz., as simply transportation
of persons or things, seems to be carried out by the unbroken current of Supreme Court decisions. Thus, Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court, has said :21
"Transportation for others, as an independent business, is
commerce irrespective of the purpose to sell or retain the.
goods which the owner may entertain with regard to them
after they shall have been delivered."
It is true that the learned justice says transportation for others
is commerce, irrespective of the purpose, but the case was a ease
dealing with transportation for others, and a judge usually and
wisely confines his language as nearly as possible to the facts of the
case. Besides, the same learned justice, speaking for the same
court, has subsequently held that the fact that the transportation is
by and for the owner of the thing transported (that is to say, the
fact that it is transportation not for others but for the transporter
himself) does not prevent the transportation from being interstate commerce. 22 Hence, it would seem to follow that interstate
transportation is interstate commerce, irrespective of the purpose
of the transportation or of the person for whom or by whom the
transportation is performed.
This view, moreover, is strongly supported by two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, both under the White
Slave Traffic Act. In the first case it was said in effect that a
woman was engaged in interstate commerce if, unsolicited and
unaided by the man, she went from one state to another for the
immoral purpose prohibited by the Act.2 3 In the second case the
19

The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548' (1914).
95 U. S. 465, 470 (1877).
21In Hanley v. Kansas City, etc. Co., 187 U. S. 617, 619 (1903).
=rhe Pipe Line Cases, supra.
Lamar and Day, JJ.,
mUntted States v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140, 145 (1915).
dissenting, one reason for the dissent being that such transit would not be interstate

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1918

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1918], Art. 4
THE "BONE-DBY"

LAW AND INTEBSTATE COMMEBGE

227

accused was indicted for transporting a woman in interstate commerce, for immoral purposes, etc. The transportation, however,
was not for a "commercial" purpose, i. e., not for purposes of
profit, as the woman was simply to become the unpaid concubine
of the accused; and it was accordingly contended that the Act
could only extend to "commercialized vice" as otherwise the transportation would not be interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
held, however, that the transportation was commerce,2 4 i. e., the
transportation was commerce in the constitutional sense though it
was not a transportation for a commercial purpose. From the
two cases, therefore, it would seem to follow that if the woman,
unsolicited and unaided by the man, bad traveled from the one
state to the other for the purely personal "non-commercial" purpose involved in the second case, such transit would be commerce
in the constitutional sense. It would seem to follow, therefore,
that the transportation in the principal case was interstate commerce and that commerce, in the sense in which it is used in the
Constitution, is simply transportation, irrespective of the purpose
of the transportation or of the ownership, if any, of that which is
transported.
Furthermore, apart from appropriate congressional legislation,
such as now exists, it is settled law that a state cannot prevent a
person from importing (through another) intoxicants for his personal non-commercial use, the reason being that such importation
is interstate commerce.25 But if the principal case is correct the
state could without such congressional legislation prevent him from
pcrsouclly importing it into the state. In other words, if the principal case is correct, then what is admittedly commerce if done
by an agent ceases to be commerce if done by the principal himself.
But such a conclusion seems absurd, for certainly the essential
nature of a transportation is the same whether it is done by the
principal himself or by his paid agent. As bearing upon this
point the following observation of the United States Supreme Court
may be mentioned:
"The means of transportation..... does not change the
characterof the business as one of commerce ........ The
grant of power [viz., "to regulate commerce"] is general in
commerce. See particularly the last paragraph of the dissenting opinion at p. 150.
and the majority opinion at p. 145.
"Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917).
-Vance v. W. A. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 438 (1898).
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its terms, making no reference to the agencies by which commerce may be carried on. It includes commerce by whomsoever conducted ..... 28 whatever be the instrumentality by
which it is carried on."1
In accord with the view herein expressed is the well-reasoned
opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in a case in which
the facts were substantially the same as in the principal case but
the conclusion reached was squarely contra. In that case, State
v. Holeyman,27 the defendants had purchased liquor in North
Carolina and had transported it in their own buggy into South
Carolina, for their own personal use. The court, however, held
that the transportation was interstate commerce although it was
a transportation by the owner for a non-commercial purpose. Said
the court:
"This brings us to a consideration of the principal element
of interstate commerce in this ease, to wit, the transportation
of the liquor. At the time the United States Constitution was
adopted the vehicles for the convenience of travel and common carriagewere insignificant as compared with those of the
present day, and the transportationof merchandise from one
state into another was to a great extent conducted under the
supervision of the purchaser and in vehicles belonging to him.
The right under the Constitution to transport merchandise
was guaranteed to him [i. e., free from state interference but
subject of course to the power granted to Congress to '!regulate" the transportation]; but, for convenience, this right
which was primarily in him might be exercised through agents
who undertook to deliver the goods to him at their destination.
......
Can it be contended for a moment that, if the defendants had employed men to transport them and their
liquors to their homes in South Carolinain buggies, the liquor,
although it was in the possession of the defendants when they
crossed the state line, would have been subject to seizure before it reached its destination? [That is, if it was interstate
commerce, the state, prior to the present congressional legislation (as the U. S. Supreme Court held it to be interstate
commerce2 "), could not seize it] .................
It
would be anomalous to hold that, if the defendants had transported the liquor through an agent, it would have been protected [as interstate commerce] until it reached its destination
and was delivered to the consignee, while, if the defendants
themselves undertook to transport the liquor, it was subject to
=Gloucester Perry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885).
MNote 3, supra. Italics, in the quotation, infra, ours.
=Vance v. W. A. Vandercook, supra.
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the laws of the state [i. e., not interstate commerce] as soon
as it came within its borders. It would be the exercise by an
agent of greater powers and the enjoyment of larger privileges
than those possessed by the principal, which cannot be done."
In another rather recent case, Alexander v. State, 9 the accused
had personally carried liquor into the state for his personal use,
but the court did not hesitate to hold the transportation interstate
commerce, although it was, as in the principal case, a transportation
by the owner for a non-commercial purpose. Said the court:
"Under the Constitution of the United States and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States it is clear
that . . . . such shipments [viz., by the owner himself for
.The
his personal use] constitute interstate commerce .....
exact language of the Supreme Court of the United State is
as follows :3 'Equally established is the proposition that the
right to send liquors from one state into another, and the act
of sending the same, is interstate commerce, the regulation
whereof has been committed by the Constitution of the United
States to Congress . . . .. The right of persons in one state to
ship liquor into another state to his residence for his own
use is derived from the Constitution of the United States and
does not rest on the state law.' "
Most text-writers have wholly ignored the point raised in the
principal case and do not cite either State v. Holleyman or Alexander v. State. The holding in State v.Holleyman, however, is set
out, apparently with approval, in CooLuEY's CONSTITUTIONAL LimTATioNS. 81 And PRENTICE AND EGAN3 2 state unqualifiedly but without authorities to support the proposition, that "the Federal power
extends over all travel and transportation among tfle states,
whether conducted for purposes of trade or not."
In the light of the authorities, therefore, and upon general principles, it would seem safe to assert that interstate transportation
is interstate commerce,. irrespective of the purpose of the transportation, and irrespective of the person by whom or for whom
the transportation is performed. Thus, the Supreme Court of the
United States has held that a person walking across an interstate
bridge is engaged in interstate commerce. Said the court :'3
"Note 8, 8upra.
"From Vance v. W. A. Vandercook, supra.
,7th ed. at p. 848.
n
ComMncz CLAuSE or TnE FEDnRAL CoxsTrTTioN, at p. 44.
=Covington, etc. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra, at p. 218.
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"The thousands of people who daily pass and repass over
this bridge may be as truly said to be engaged in commerce
as if they were shipping cargoes of merchandise .......
But just as truly thousands of these thousands who cross do not
cross and recross for so-called commercial purposes. Are, then, the
thousands who cross for pleasure or non-commercial purposes to
be distinguished in this respect from those who cross for so-called
"commercial" purposes? If so, the Supreme Court does not draw
any such distinction and such a distinction would be wholly impractical and practically unenforceable. If there is such a distinction then the state regulation in the case before the Supreme Court
would have been valid as to those crossing for non-commercial purposes for that would not be interstate commerce, but invalid as to
those crossing for commercial purposes. But the court drew no such
distinction. To make such an unworkable distinction would be to
invoke an impractical technicality, whereas it has been laid down
by the United States Supreme Court that commerce "is not a
technical legal conception but a practical one."134 To somewhat
the same effect the Court of Appeals of New York has recently
held that
"It is not practical in determining the application of the
Federal or the state law to distinguish between the transportation of supplies from one state to another for the carriers'
own use and transportation of merchandise for sale or exchange. "''
Accordingly it is submitted that it is not practical to draw any
distinction between transportation by the owner for so-called "commercial" and transportation by the owner for so-called "noncommercial" purposes; that each is commerce in the constitutional
sense, that to hold so does violence neither to language nor to legal
principle, but rather gives full effect to the "largest import" of
the term commerce, enables Congress to regulate evils which would
seem to fall clearly within the general purpose of the commerce
clause; and finally not only effectuates complete justice, but at the
same time avoids the adoption of a wholly unpractical, technical
and unnecessary limitation to a just and practical general rule.
"Per Mr. Justice Holmes in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398 (1905).
Barlow v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 214 N. Y. 116, 107 N. E. 814 (1915).
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